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Executive summary
•  Power-sharing may involve not only political power-sharing, but shared governance over economic   
resources or the security sector, and in some cases territorial autonomy arrangements
• There are at least five critical challenges to negotiating a peace agreement involving power-sharing:
- Mistrust may outweigh the influence of the power- sharing incentives offered
- The third-party guarantee needed to overcome mistrust is not available
- The incentives that are offered may not be the right ones
- If there are no measures to address the original causes of conflict, incentives may not be enough
- Incentives cannot induce so-called spoilers to participate in a peace process
• There are far more potential challenges to implementing power-sharing agreements in practice:
- Agreements may be violated because incentives were insufficient or can be obtained more easily outside the agreement
- Agreement fails because a group was less interested in, or unable to reap the benefits of, specific incentives
- Old patterns of mistrust and cheating are imported into governance processes and state institutions
-  Instead of creating a grand coalition, power-sharing may create incentives for extremism      
and ethnic or hardliner outbidding
- Incentives such as territorial autonomy may encourage secessionist tendencies
- Parties may have committed to agreement out of short-term pragmatism rather than long term interest or policy
- Exclusion of groups from benefits may encourage new grievances and even conflicts
- Competition may turn violent amongst former allies
- Violent regions or the interference of neighbouring states may undermine agreements
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introduction
This policy paper seeks to offer insights for policymakers 
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the use of 
power-sharing in peace processes.   It is based upon 
close studies in three countries with protracted armed 
conflicts and peace processes—Sri Lanka, Sudan, and 
Colombia—as well as comparative analysis of nearly 
thirty peace processes involving power-sharing elements 
since the end of the Cold War. Power-sharing should 
be understood as a broad strategy, comprising not only 
power-sharing as traditionally understood, involving 
political power-sharing, but also other governance 
incentives commonly offered to induce armed groups 
to negotiate peace agreements, and to implement 
peace agreements, such as resource-sharing, inclusion 
in security structures, and territorial autonomy. Close 
examination demonstrates that while these incentives 
often have appeal for armed groups, this appeal is often 
overrated, and may frequently generate institutional 
arrangements and political dynamics that are unstable in 
the medium to long term. A re-evaluation of this strategy 
is sorely needed, as it is commonly deployed relatively 
uncritically, and power-sharing and similar incentives 
can often reify existing cleavages in societies, increasing 
rather than decreasing the risk of conflict. Specifically, 
power-sharing may import or embed social divisions that 
have the potential to become conflictual in new, weak, 
or dysfunctional institutions of governance that are not 
prepared to manage them.
 
why power sharing?
Contemporary peace negotiations addressing internal 
armed conflicts often seek  to induce armed groups, 
whether rebel, military, paramilitary, or police, to lay 
down their arms through incentives which may alleviate 
the so-called security dilemma, or fears that if they 
negotiate and disarm, they will be vulnerable to attack.  
Thus, peacemaking arrangements that provide them 
access to power, and offer them guarantees of security 
in the postconflict setting, are often used to lure groups 
to negotiations.  An example of such incentives or 
arrangements is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) of 2005, which formally ended the conflict between 
the government of Sudan based in Khartoum in the north 
and the SPLA/M based in Southern Sudan. One element 
of the agreement was that John Garang, the leader of 
the SPLA/M, became vice president of Sudan as well as 
president of the new government of southern Sudan. 
Comparative research shows that the success of these 
lures of participation will vary by context and group, which 
is perhaps not surprising but is important to understand 
so that rigid templates or formulae for peacemaking 
are not deployed. Even groups that purport to be 
fighting for access to power, or regional autonomy and 
self-governance, may not be induced by governance 
incentives.
The popularity of power-sharing arrangements emerged 
from peacebuilding in the early 1990s, for example in El 
Salvador, where the former rebel group, the Farabundo 
Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí 
para la Liberación Nacional [FMLN]), was successfully 
brought into the structures of power and transformed 
into a legitimate political party, with some of its members 
included in the reformed armed forces and police. Many 
analysts, perhaps too optimistically, concluded that 
armed groups wanted a seat at the table and access 
to legitimation and political power, and that this would 
in many instances suffice to ensure their participation in 
negotiations and compliance with peace agreements.
The current study examined the use of power-
sharing incentives closely in three conflict settings: 
Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Sudan, and in about 
thirty post-Cold War peace deals in somewhat less 
detail. The Sri Lankan and Colombian conflicts 
remain to be resolved, while Sudan is experiencing 
an uneasy peace. In Sri Lanka, negotiations 
with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
are examined; in Colombia, negotiations with 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
[FARC]) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército 
Liberación Nacional [ELN]); and in Sudan, the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A).
It is evident that power-sharing does not always 
offer a strong incentive for armed groups to 
cooperate, as demonstrated by the collapse of 
the 1999 Lomé peace accord in Sierra Leone, 
discussed further below in implementation failures. 
On the logic of the Salvadoran example and many 
others, those who negotiated the Lomé accord, 
and those who supported it internationally, 
reasoned that these were the incentives required 
to bring the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to 
the table and end the fighting. As is well known, 
fighting and serious human rights abuses resumed 
shortly after.
The author is most grateful to the British Academy for supporting research in Sri Lanka (SG 39303) and Colombia (SG 41812), the Nuffield Foundation for supporting research in 
Sudan (SGS/01159/G), and the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for providing supplemental funding. The full study is published as: Peace as governance: Power-sharing, 
armed groups, and contemporary peace negotiations (Palgrave 2008).
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forms of power-sharing
Peace agreements have often included 
elaborate institutional arrangements, with 
power-sharing along one or more of four 
dimensions: economic, polit ical, security, 
and territorial. The study treats all of these 
as power-sharing arrangements, even though 
they operate differently. These institutional 
arrangements are designed to generate 
incentives for armed groups to participate in 
negotiations and implement the agreements 
that they reach, in large part through alleviating 
security dilemmas. Institutional arrangements 
are also often developed to counter the weak, 
corrupt, or collapsed state structures at the 
root of many conflicts. It is hoped that these 
new institutions might lessen the incentives of 
all social forces to return to violent conflict. 
Statistical and comparative studies suggest that 
power-sharing along one or more of the four 
dimensions, particularly in tandem with third-
party guarantees, strengthens the robustness 
of peace agreements. In particular, existing 
studies have found that third-party guarantees 
are critical to the survival of peace agreements. 
However, peacebuilders on the ground often 
have control over the presence of third-party 
guarantors, which depends on political interest 
and the wil l of states to act alone or through the 
UN.  The four types of power-sharing incentives 
often used in the breach, in the absence of 
those third-party guarantees which are often so 
diff icult to secure.
A number of key challenges arise when 
peacemakers seek to use governance 
incentives—political, security, territorial, and 
economic ones—to reach and implement peace 
agreements. These are, broadly speaking, 
challenges of negotiation and challenges of 
implementation.
why negotiations often fail
Despite the apparent incentives that power-
sharing deals offer to insecure armed groups, 
many efforts at negotiating peace deals sti l l fail, 
for a range of reasons.
Mistrust
First, though governance incentives may logically 
offer a way out of the security dilemma faced by 
armed groups, mistrust among them may result 
in fear of disarming. Governments may also be 
unprepared to offer such incentives, believing 
either that armed groups wil l use the negotiation 
or cease-fire period to rearm, or that once 
empowered with such access to governance 
the groups wil l harm those currently in power or 
the state itself. There is some evidence that Sri 
Lanka’s LTTE used periods of negotiation and 
cease-fire to rearm and strengthen its position; 
its enhanced military capacity was dramatically 
i l lustrated with its first use of airplanes in 2007. 
Similarly, the governments of Colombia and 
Sri Lanka have opposed the use of most of the 
incentives considered here for the FARC, the 
ELN, and the LTTE, although the government 
of Colombia has used inclusion incentives with 
other armed groups.
Absence of third-party guarantor
Second, such incentives may foster trust only 
if a third-party guarantee is also present. 
Such guarantees have not been present in 
recent peace processes in Colombia or Sri 
Lanka. In Colombia, the OAS support mission, 
while important, lacks muscle, and there is 
no prospect of an international or regional 
peacekeeping force should peace be reached 
with either major leftist rebel group. In Sri 
Lanka the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission had a 
l imited mandate, and the Indian government 
would l ikely have blocked an international or  
regional peacekeeping force. The negotiation 
of Sudan’s CPA was arguably bolstered by the 
presence of strong regional mediators and the 
prospect of a UN peacekeeping force, while the 
l imited participation in the Darfur negotiations 
may reflect the poor prospect for a robust 
international force there. While we as analysts 
or advocates might wish that a third-party 
guarantor always be available, we know that 
often it is not.
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The wrong incentives 
Third, it may simply be the case that the wrong 
incentives are being offered. For example, 
some groups value territorial autonomy and 
governance of resources, but have no particular 
interest in governing at the national level. These 
groups might not be interested in signing an 
agreement that offers them, say, participation in 
national security forces or in parliament. Such 
was the case with the LTTE, which engaged in 
predation and coercive extraction of support
funds from the Tamil diaspora globally, but 
did not seek resource-sharing in negotiations; 
nor did the i l l-fated tsunami aid-distribution 
mechanism appear to be a significant incentive. 
The LTTE’s demands were largely for territorial 
autonomy, self-governance, or complete 
independence, so the offer of resource-sharing 
was unlikely to be a significant incentive. By 
comparison, while the FARC and the ELN 
do demand territorial control, and engage in 
rhetoric that at least purports to defend their 
putative constituents, these demands have 
largely been driven by short-term security 
concerns rather than desires for long-term 
control over specific territories. They are also 
clearly l inked to drug cultivation and criminal 
activity, which have enabled them to fund 
fighting, but which have also become ends in 
themselves. However, the demands that they 
have made with regard to state resources have 
not been for resource-sharing, but for more 
equitable distribution of resources across the 
populace. In Sudan, the SPLM/A had the most 
clearly articulated demands for power- and 
resource-sharing, and territorial autonomy. It 
had less apparent interest in inclusion in security 
forces, which is at odds with future autonomy, 
so perhaps it should be no surprise the 
implementation of these provisions have been 
more problematic (see below).
Original demands not addressed
Fourth, clearly these incentives alone wil l not be 
enough to impel armed groups to sign any peace 
agreement: they wil l insist that some of their 
original demands, those that drove them to take 
up arms, be met as well. Where such incentives, 
such as autonomy, are the original demands, 
this may facil itate agreement. The SPLM/A’s 
platform had for some time alternately included 
fundamental change in the national government 
and regional independence; it achieved the 
f irst at least formally, and the prospect of the 
second through a referendum in the CPA. By 
comparison, LTTE demands for autonomy have 
only ever been met historically by very weak 
decentralization, and devolution remains a ‘dirty 
word’ in mainstream Sri Lankan politics. Indeed, 
the only power-sharing that does occur in Sri 
Lanka, within electoral polit ics, has tended to 
radicalize polit ics, as mainstream parties are 
compelled to form coalition governments with 
Buddhist fundamentalist parties. In Colombia, 
even if the government were prepared to offer 
the FARC or the ELN governance incentives, it 
is unclear what the appeal of these would be in 
the absence of fundamental reform of the land 
system and given the economic disparities that 
have been central to the rebels’ motivations, or 
at least their ideological arguments.
‘Spoilers’
Finally, these incentives can seldom eliminate 
the ‘spoiler problem’, and may actually create 
spoilers, or at least consolidate opposition 
of groups that were previously positive or 
neutral toward the peace process. Peace 
agreements can seldom be comprehensive 
given the large number of interested parties.  
Opposition groups, armed or otherwise, as well 
as government hard-liners, may oppose peace 
agreements that exclude them or that they feel 
give away too much. Disenfranchised groups 
may even take up arms if they see agreements 
progressing that appear to exclude them and 
divide the pie of power and resources in a 
permanent fashion.
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why agreements often 
don’t last
Alternatively, while peace agreements that uti l ize 
some or all of these governance incentives 
may be concluded successfully, a number of 
challenges may arise at the implementation level. 
Incentives not valued, or easily obtained through 
violation
Parties may conclude an agreement, but one or 
more may then easily violate it either because 
the incentives were not important to the group, 
or because the group can achieve its goals, and 
more, through violence. An example is the 1999 
Lomé Accord in Sierra Leone, which provided 
the RUF leadership with access to control over 
resources, directly and indirectly. Not only 
was Foday Sankoh made a vice president and 
a minister with control over diamond mines, 
but Johnny Paul Koroma was also made the 
head of the government commission for peace 
consolidation. Yet as we know, the RUF rapidly 
returned to fighting—control over diamonds was 
an insufficient incentive, as the RUF already 
had attained de facto control over many mines. 
And evidently, broader polit ical rule was not of 
significant interest to the RUF either.
Incentives of lower value or group unable to 
exploit them
A group may sign an agreement involving 
incentives that are of lesser interest to them, or 
that they are unable to partake of adequately. 
In Sudan, for example, many suggest that the 
SPLM really was interested in the possibil ity 
of complete independence, interim autonomy, 
resources, and autonomous security forces. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement gave 
it all of these things, as well as proportional 
participation in the central government, and in 
joint security forces. But many in the SPLM/A 
forces have resisted the idea of participating 
in joint security forces and being redeployed 
outside what they expect to be their own 
country in the future. Many of the SPLM 
members who have taken up posts as heads 
of government ministries appear to have been 
unprepared for their roles, or are unable to 
actually direct embedded bureaucracies. In 
Colombia, when the rebel group M-19 disarmed 
and formed a political party, it was considered 
unusually prepared, as a group led by many 
urban educated people, to function in polit ics. 
Yet while a few individual polit icians were able 
to thrive, the party failed.
Mistrust or cheating imported into governance
Further diff iculties may arise when patterns of 
mistrust and cheating are simply transported 
into institutions of governance, new and old. In 
Sudan, many of the institutions developed by 
the peace agreement to ensure implementation 
of specific governance incentives—the 
petroleum commission, the DDR commissions, 
and the like—have not been operational, or 
have been highly dysfunctional. In Sudan, when 
SPLM members were placed at the head of 
key ministries, many of the functions of those 
ministries were first transferred to presidency, 
which was dominated by the NCP and the old 
government. Such cheating and manipulation 
of institutional structures can increase mistrust 
and, where it is severe, provoke a revival 
of tensions or even conflict. Nascent state 
institutions may be unable to manage conflict, 
or conflict may be managed in repressive 
ways. The result could be collapse of a peace 
agreement, failure of state institutions, or more 
violent resolution of disputes.
Incentives for extremism
Implementation may fail or have unintended 
consequences when power-sharing fails to 
create a grand coalit ion, but rather creates 
incentives for extremism and ethnic or polit ical 
hard-liner outbidding. Centrist parties may be 
pulled to one extreme and find themselves able 
to maintain power only by forming coalit ions 
with extremist parties, or by taking more 
extreme stands themselves. While the electoral 
system in Sri Lanka is not the direct result 
of a power-sharing peace agreement, this 
may explain why politicians who reach power 
advocating peace have often quickly formed 
coalitions with hard-line Buddhist parties such 
as the JHU or JVP.
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Promotion of separatist demands
A related challenge is that regionalization, 
territorial autonomy, and certain modes of 
federalism or decentralization may encourage 
separatist tendencies and the breakup of 
the state. Alternatively, such strategies may 
encourage the homogenization of populations. 
Where pre-conflict populations were mixed 
and were displaced into more homogeneous 
communities by conflict, they may not remix 
after the conflict, or may do so very slowly. 
Further, autonomous territories may not 
be sustainable without serious resource 
commitments from the central government 
or the international community. Obviously, 
central governments, which are l ikely to 
be dominated by a group that is ethnically, 
l inguistically, or religiously distinct from the 
majority of the autonomous region, may not 
be committed to financing that autonomy. 
Some analysts suggest that this explains the 
breakdown of Sudan’s Addis Ababa Agreement 
of 1972; conversely, the presence of oil and the 
development of oil extraction in southern Sudan 
today could in theory assist its government 
in developing its own capacity over time. The 
international community might support and aid 
an autonomous region, such as Kosovo, but 
concern about the maintenance of sovereignty 
and the stabil ity of states means it won’t often 
do so.
Lack of long-term commitment
Further, one or more parties may have 
committed to power-sharing arrangements out 
of short-term pragmatism rather than as part 
of long-term policy. If they see governance 
arrangements as mere tools to achieve power 
through nonviolent means, they may be unlikely 
to comply with the agreement if they feel the 
strategy is fail ing—for example, because an 
adversary is l ikely to do better outside elections. 
This may particularly be the case if power-
sharing is viewed as imported or externally 
imposed, as was arguably the case in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Where politics is historically 
clientelistic, corrupt, personalistic, or absolutist, 
parties committing to democratization and 
power-sharing may do so for cynical or short-
term ends, and will eventually seek to obtain 
absolute power. It has been argued that this was 
the case in Cambodia in the mid-1990s, and in 
many African states that emerged from conflict.
Exclusion from agreements promotes 
radicalization or new demands
An extremely dangerous risk is the creation of 
new conflicts, or the stoking of existing conflicts, 
where power-sharing excludes significant parties 
or interests. The pragmatic choice to include 
only warring parties, or only powerful parties, 
at the negotiating table spawns potential new 
spoilers. Some Muslims in Sri Lanka, persistently 
excluded from the formal negotiating process, 
have become increasingly radicalized, and 
may see violence as the only route to staking a 
claim. The CPA in Sudan appears to have incited 
groups in the east and Darfur to use violence 
to get their demands heard regarding land, 
resources, and discrimination, out of concern 
that the north, under the peace agreement, wil l 
divide the power and resources of the country 
with the south while keeping them marginalized.
Violence amongst former all ies
After an agreement, violence may erupt not 
among former enemies but among former all ies. 
This is not a problem unique to power-sharing 
arrangements, but may well emerge in them. 
Peace agreements generally seek to address 
the grievances that initiated the original conflict, 
and power-sharing seeks to address the fears 
and demands of the original combatants in 
relation to each other. However, in either a 
former government or a former rebel group, one 
or more factions may be privi leged over others 
in the division of the ‘spoils’ of peace. If this is 
the case, fighting and factional divisions among 
former all ies, or rifts within groups, may result. 
In Sri Lanka, the split of the Karuna faction with 
the LTTE, which occurred during the cease-
fire rather than the implementation stage, was 
nonetheless indicative of concerns within the 
rebel group that any potential peace agreement 
would privi lege northern Tamils over eastern 
Tamils. This fear might help to explain the 
otherwise curious collaboration of the Karuna 
faction with the Sri Lankan army.
Unstable regions and interference by neighbours
Finally, implementation of power-sharing may 
be challenged in unstable regions, or where 
neighbours interfere in the peace process. The 
involvement of other states may destabil ize 
internal pacts, whether the neighbouring states’ 
interests are polit ical, or also l inked to ethnic 
kinship or rivalries. Thus scholars have pointed 
to the destabil izing role of both Israel and Syria 
in Lebanon, or of neighbouring states and 
refugee flows in Rwanda, on power-sharing 
arrangements.
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ideal conditions seldom exist
It is critical to recognize that ideal conditions 
for negotiating and implementing power-sharing 
arrangements seldom exist, precisely because 
of the security dilemma and mistrust that such 
arrangements are designed to alleviate. Though 
power-sharing arrangements have achieved 
well-documented success in stabil izing some 
ethnically divided countries in Europe, such 
as Belgium, promoting and implementing such 
arrangements in countries with recent histories 
of bloody, often protracted, violent conflict has 
proven rather more diff icult, as demonstrated 
by several in-depth studies of negotiations in 
Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Colombia, as well as the 
survey of post–Cold War peace agreements 
that incorporated such arrangements. This is 
perhaps not surprising, if we consider how many 
challenges exist in such situations.
what can be done?  Policy 
options and recommendations
Given that ideal conditions seldom exist, 
and in particular third-party guarantees 
may not be available, what options remain 
for peacemakers?  Should power-sharing 
approaches be abandoned? A number of 
options and recommendations emerge from our 
studies which might guide peacemakers.
Develop an agreement without power-sharing 
Given some of the pitfalls of both negotiating 
and implementing peace deals involving power-
sharing, policymakers should carefully consider 
whether these types of incentives are l ikely to 
have appeal in the situation and with the groups 
at hand.  They should not assume that such 
incentives wil l work. In such circumstances, 
policymakers may need to consider which 
incentives or assurances may have greater 
traction. However, if one seeks to promote 
power-sharing arrangements, they may need to 
be better-designed for the situation at hand.
Carefully consider which incentives might matter
Peacemakers should carefully consider which 
incentives might matter to the particular 
groups at hand: a group which has clearly and 
consistently sought access to polit ical power, 
or has even administered a territory in a de 
facto rather than de jure fashion might be more 
interested in posts in the executive, legislature, 
or bureaucracy.  
Consider why even apparently good incentives 
may not suffice
Even incentives which would appear to fit a 
group’s agenda may not suffice: for example 
many viewed the RUF in Sierra Leone as 
primarily interested in access to resources.  
This may have been the case, but relatively 
significant control over diamond mines did not 
suffice. 
Identify means to bolster the value of incentives
Incentives such as participation in polit ical 
governance may lose value where they cannot 
be fully exploited.  Measures such as technical 
support and training may bolster a group’s 
capacity to engage in governance, as might 
material assistance.
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Key recommendations: 
a summary
•  Develop an agreement without power-sharing 
•   Carefully consider which incentives   
might matter
•   Consider why even apparently good incentives 
may not suffice
•   Identify means to bolster the value of 
incentives
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